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Note to Schmooze participants: I have taken advantage of Mark’s invitation to present
informal work by presenting a modified version of a grant proposal for a database
project. I appreciate your understanding and feedback at this early stage of the project.
The project relates to the theme of “Juristocracy” in two ways: first it will provide
systematic data on the constitutional status of the judiciary over time and space; and
second it will catalog trends in rights provisions that are so often the fulcrum for
judicialization efforts. TG

Overview
Waves of national independence and democratization have deposited a varying set
of political and legal institutions across the world in the last fifty years. For the most
part, these institutions are set out formally in national constitutions. However, no
systematic dataset exists that records the characteristics and provisions of national
constitutions. Such a basic set of data is indispensable for the simple, but important, goal
of describing and comparing constitutions. It is also indispensable, as we submit below,
for testing theoretical predictions about the origins and consequences of various
constitutional provisions. As such, we propose to construct a comprehensive dataset of
the form and content of national constitutions, past and present.
Theoretical Motivations
While these data will likely have general applicability to a broad range of research
questions (see the next section), a motivating question for the principal investigators
concerns the historical roots of certain institutions. In particular, the investigators intend
to use the data to test predictions regarding the diffusion of constitutional design
elements. Our basic expectation, stated quite generally, is that the constitutional
provisions of peer countries have a decisive impact on the decisions of constitutional
engineers regardless of a state’s particular institutional needs and constraints.
Constitutions are influenced not just by domestic political bargains, but by trends, ideas
and models adopted from other constitutions. These ideas and models diffuse across
space and time. Our intention is to test diffusion hypotheses with a comprehensive set of
cross-national, historical data. We will determine (i) whether diffusion theories explain
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constitutional change, and (ii) which aspects of constitutional design are most susceptible
to diffusion.
The investigators’ diffusion framework, although complementary to traditional
approaches to constitutional design, departs from these approaches. Traditional
explanations of constitutional design focus on interests, passions, and the public good
(Elster 1996). Interest-based accounts (e.g. Mueller 2000; Cooter 2003) focus on rational
choice of self-interested designers. Other scholars, however, emphasize emotions and
constraints on rational choice (e.g., Elster et al., 1997). A third school of thought,
captured in most normative legal scholarship, suggests that constitutional drafters are
motivated by a higher purpose and that constitutions are designed with the best interests
of the public in mind.
Our diffusion perspective does not contradict these causal stories. However, it
does introduce an altogether different set of factors. Diffusion, which we define as a
general set of processes by which one government’s adoption of a constitutional element
affects the probability that another actor adopt the same element (Elkins 2003; Simmons
and Elkins 2004), emphasizes the influence of factors external to the state. Context and
fashion, in this line of reasoning, matter as much as a government’s particular propensity
for a given institution. Exactly when and how context matters, of course, is the critical
theoretical question of interest to the investigators. The investigators have identified
various plausible diffusion processes with respect to institutional development (Elkins
2003; Elkins and Simmons 2005), each of which implies an hypothesis testable with the
dataset the investigators propose to construct. For example, the investigators expect that
the cognitive and research capabilities of constitutional designers are constrained in
predictable patterns. One pattern is that designers pay disproportionate attention to the
constitutions of states that are highly “available,” in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky
(1982). So, we should expect that the constitutions of countries with high levels of
interaction and communication (measured by levels of trade, linguistic similarity,
telephone flows, or mail flows) will be more accessible and, so, more similar. For similar
reasons, we should expect the constitutions of geographically proximate states to show
marked similarities. On the other hand, it might be the case that constitutional learning
follows a different pattern. It might be that constitutional framers model their institutions
after countries that are similar to theirs in important ways, reasoning that what is good for
an analogous state will be good for them. In a similar vein, it might be that a state’s
success – measured by political stability or wealth – inspires imitators.
Diffusion explanations are intriguing because they imply that governments are
making choices that they would not make if left to their own devices (if such a thing were
possible in constitution-writing). These “detours” in the policy process are indeed
interesting from an historical or political development perspective. However, they also
portend important consequences for the quality of government policies. We see two
interesting possibilities. Diffusion may imply that governments adopt sub-optimal or
inappropriate policies designed for the needs of others. Alternatively, diffusion may
imply that governments adopt policies superior to those they have the resources or
knowledge to engineer for themselves. The question, then, is whether diffusion is
responsible for a nation’s squeezing into ill-fitting, but fashionable institutions or whether
it leads them to the most functional and efficient ones available? We might lean towards
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the first conclusion, if only for a cultural preference for creativity and originality over
imitation and conformity. However, the second conclusion appears equally plausible,
especially after a number of scholars have begun to burnish the image of imitation,
emphasizing its utility as a cognitive shortcut for problems whose answers are not always
obvious (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Imitation, in this light, is not slavish. It is an
efficient and effective mode of behavior for policy makers. We aspire to draw
conclusions regarding the social welfare implications of diffusion processes. The first
step, however, is to specify the causal sequence of events.
The proper testing of the hypotheses we suggest above requires data on a
country’s basic political and economic attributes as well as its relationship with other
countries (Simmons and Elkins 2004). Most importantly, however, the analysis requires
systematic measurement of similarity across national constitutions. It is these measures
of similarity that we expect to construct from the dataset we describe below.
A Resource for other Scholars
We expect that the dataset we describe will be useful to a large number of social
scientists concerned with the origins and impacts of political and legal institutions. Most
obviously, a formal accounting of institutional elements of constitutions makes for a
ready set of independent and dependent variables that allow political scientists,
economists, and public law scholars to test many of the institutional arguments popular in
these disciplines. Crucially, a measure of particular components of constitutions allows
scholars to analyze and describe discrete elements of important constructs such as
presidentialism, parliamentarism, federalism, judicial review, and electoral systems.
Amendment processes will also be documented (Lutz 1994). The dataset, as we envision
it, also makes for a useful resource to study institutional evolution and adaptation within
states across time. How resistant to change are institutional designs? Under what
conditions do institutions change?
Another research program might use the data to compare the match between a
state’s formal institutional framework and its actual conduct. Some scholars have
suggested that the dictates of a constitution are sometimes at odds with actual behavior.
In order to test these claims, one needs a systematic accounting of constitutional
elements. The dataset will allow scholars to evaluate different configurations of
institutions and their effect on, for example, democratic performance, economic growth,
and other dependent variables of interest (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
We should emphasize that the dataset will include variables pertaining to the form
and style of the written document, not just its institutional provisions. As we describe
below, we intend to code characteristics of the structure, organization, length, and style of
the documents. This may provide tools for innovative research programs on the
specificity of constitutions.
Constitutional scholars are paying increasing attention to the global aspects of
constitutionalism, including both the spread of particular human rights provisions and an
increasing transnational “conversation” of judges in interpreting the constitution
(Slaughter 2003).The database will provide a resource to document the spread of
particular rights and linguistic features in a systermatic fashion. Finally, explanatory
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power notwithstanding, we suspect that describing the way in which states have chosen to
craft constitutions, and how these choices have varied over time, will be interesting in its
own right. Such a descriptive resource can be of great value in both research and
teaching.
Proposed Indicators
An important and delicate task in this project is the selection of those attributes of
constitutions that we wish to record. At this point we have identified approximately 200
aspects -- of both form and content – of written constitutions that we believe are worth
measuring. In constructing this list we have reviewed works from the literature on
comparative constitutions as well as the limited number of data projects. In this regard,
the Maarseveen and van der Tang (1978) volume has served a particularly useful
foundation from which to build, as has the key system that was developed by
Tschentscher (2004). However, neither of these earlier efforts is sufficient in our view.
We have adopted several major categories of variables.
I.

Amendment processes

II.

Rights

III.

Duties (e.g. military service, obedience)

IV.

Elections (includes political party regulation, suffrage, referenda)

V.

Government Structure: Executive

VI.

Government Structure: Legislature

VII.

Judiciary

VIII.

Constitutional court

IX.

Other constitutional institutions (ombudsmen, human rights
commission)

X.

Federalism/Local government

XI.

International Law

XII.

Other Characteristics

One issue is the proper level of detail we ought include in the coding. Our current list of
“rights,” for example, included some 200 different variables. This may be beyond the
scope of our effort to achieve.
As an example of the kinds of questions we seek to code for, the following list is a
provisional set of questions in the “Judiciary” section.
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A. Administrative Law
Does the constitution provide for a administrative court? (1/0)
How appointed?
Nomination by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4legislative supermajority; 5-judicial council
Approval by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4legislative supermajority; 5-judicial council
Term length? (ordinal)
Does the constitution contain provisions protecting the individual against illegal/ultra vires
administrative actions?(1/0)
B. Constitutional Court
Does the constitution contain provisions concerning a special constitutional court(1/0)
Does the Constitutional court have powers besides reviewing legislation and treaties for
constitutionality? (1/0)
What are the powers?
1-supervisiong elections; 2-supervising political parties; 3-impeachment
4-states of emergency; 5-reviewing organic statutes of local government; 6-other
What is the term of justices? (ordinal)
How are justices appointed?
Nomination by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4legislative supermajority; 5-judicial council
Approval by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4legislative supermajority; 5-judicial council
Who has standing to refer a question? 1-presdient, executive organs; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative
majority; 4-legislative minority; 5-public
What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality?
What is timing of review? 1-post-promulgation; 2-pre-promulgation; 3-either
C. Judicial Independence
Does the constitution contain an explicit declaration regarding the independence of the central
judicial organ(s)? (1/0)
Does the constitution stipulate that judges can be impeached? (1/0)
Is a majority or supermajority required for impeachment? 1-majority; 2-supermajority
Who is involved in the impeachment of judges? 1-legislature, 2-executive, 3-judiciary; 4-judicial
council
Does the constitution stipulate that courts have to take into account decisions of higher courts?
(1/0)
D. Judicial Appointment
Does the constitution stipulate in what way people become members of ordinary courts
Nomination by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-legislative
supermajority; 5-judicial council
Approval by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-legislative
supermajority; 5-judicial council
Are judicial terms specified for ordinary judges? (1/0) How long? (ordinal)
Does the constitution stipulate in what way people become members of the highest ordinary court
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Nomination by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-legislative
supermajority; 5-judicial council
Approval by: 1-presdient, executive; 2-judiciary; 3- legislative majority; 4-legislative
supermajority; 5-judicial council
Are judicial terms specified for the supreme court? (1/0) How long? (ordinal)

E. Powers
Does the constitution contain provisions with regard to advisory opinions of ordinary judicial
organs? (1/0)
Does the constitution contain provisions allowing review of ordinary legislation by judicial and/or
other state-organs(1/0)
Does the constitution stipulate whether decisions of the highest ordinary court are final (in
general) (1/0)

Sampling Considerations
The proposed unit of analysis in this study is the country-year. The resulting
dataset will, therefore, report characteristics of constitutions in force for each year. The
alternative, and perhaps more intuitive, approach would be to treat each constitution as a
unit. However, distinguishing discrete constitutions within a country’s history is
sometimes problematic. Some countries do have constitutions that are clearly distinct
documents and are recorded as such (e.g., the Brazilian constitutions of 1988, 1968,
1945, and 1889). Other countries, however, make substantial modifications to a
constitution without renaming the document (e.g. South Korea’s six republics since
independence have each been created through what are technically constitutional
amendments). Some countries may make only modest modifications but celebrate a
“new” constitution. As such, dividing documents into discrete drafts or versions invokes
a set of unnecessary judgments in our view. Our preference is to document modifications
in constitutions as they occur. Under this process, “new” constitutions will be obvious to
the extent that they exhibit form and content that is distinct from those in the document of
the prior year. While the country-year approach appears daunting, we believe it will be
manageable. For each constitution, we will obtain information on constitutional
amendments and use these to describe the shifts over time within each country. As a
practical matter, the dataset would include only those country years for which a change
occurs. For analytical purposes, of course, older values can be carried over to intervening
years in which no change occurs in order to construct an uninterrupted time series.
In terms of coverage across time and space, our goal is to be comprehensive. The
advantage of this sort of dataset, we believe, is to cover a large set of countries and time
periods in a systematic way. Furthermore, the availability of national constitutions
encourages us to be expansive. Texts of worldwide constitutions (at least current
versions) are available for most independent states, great and small (e.g., Flanz and
Blaustein 2004; Tschentscher 2004)
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Dissemination of Results
The investigators will design a web site to disseminate the dataset and any
publications related to it. The dataset will also be archived at the University of
Michigan’s ICPSR data archive.
Conclusion
The database project described herein will allow us to systematically analyze the
diffusion of constitutional ideas and institutions, and to test whether and when similar
countries adopt similar constitutions. Beyond our immediate research concerns,
however, we believe the database will provide a useful resource for a broader research
program on formal aspects of constitutions. This is an area of growing research interest
in law and the social sciences, and informs issues of continuing importance to policymakers involved in legal and constitutional reform efforts.
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